In 1981 the Iran-sponsored Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain attempted to stage a coup. However, the plot was discovered and foiled as activists made their preparations.
Members of the Islamic Front, who were mainly Shirazis (Shia followers of Ayatollah Mohammed Shirazi), dispersed around the world. Many of the key figures would continue pursuing their goal of an Islamic state in Bahrain through new organizational frameworks and using new tactics. However the failure of the coup plot represented a major setback for these radical activists that would take many years to overcome.
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain after the failed coup
Of those elements of the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain who fled into exile; many dispersed to more flexible locations across the region, like Syria, Iran and Iraq. The main offices of the Islamic Front came to be based in Damascus, with branches in Tehran and London.The Secretary-General was Muhammad Ali Al-Khadhari. Its London office was headed by Abdalhamid Al-Radhi. The pivotal figure, Hadi Al-Mudarrisi, would later return to his native Iraq.
Many chose to base themselves in the West; particularly the younger and lesser-known figures who could use the opportunity to study abroad; or benefit from the experience of other exiled activists based in Europe. Many of these younger figures would play significant roles in incidents of unrest in Bahrain in later decades.
The Shirazi activist Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja was in Damascus from 1983-89 and then ended up in Denmark; where he became involved in a succession of human rights organizations that could be used to give a more credible voice to the opposition. By establishing links with many western and global human rights organizations, this strategy of human rights activism would pay off in later years by ensuring that many significant organizations were highly receptive to the opposition’s narrative.
The Shirazi movement loses favour in Iran
From the mid-1980s onwards, the Shirazis lost much of their influence with the Iranian regime. This was partly as a result of Ayatollah Mohammed Shirazi increasingly being seen as a rival to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini.
Shirazi came out and challenged Khomeini on a number of issues, most notably their differing views of the two clerics on the principle of Welayat Al-Faqih. While Khomeini advocated rule by the single most-learned Faqih; Mohammed Shirazi advocated the idea of “Shurat Al-Maraji” – rule by a council of the most senior religious authorities.
Ayatollah Khomeini sought to ensure that the Qom religious authorities spoke with one voice, with Khomeini as the ultimate and unchallengeable authority. Mohammed Shirazi’s huge charismatic status and religious legitimacy stood as a challenge to this, so it was inevitable that Khomeini sought to reduce his political influence and access to patronage networks.
As a result, from the mid-1980s onwards the Shirazis would never regain the regional significance that they enjoyed around the time of the Islamic revolution.
Another factor was Iran’s failure to make progress in the Iraq war, as well as the emergence of pragmatic conservatives like President Rafsanjani (1989-1997). As part of Rafsanjani’s moves to mend relations with the Arab Gulf states, the Islamic Front’s offices in Tehran were closed down.
From now on, the Islamic Republic would seek to wield its influence in Bahrain and the GCC through direct relations with Shia activists and grassroots organizations, not through relatively independent networks like the Shirazis which didn’t always share the same agenda.
Declining influence: The Islamic front in the 1990s
During the 1990s unrest in Bahrain the “Shirazis” were marginalized for being perceived as too close to Iran. With many of its experience activists exiled abroad the Islamic Front was not well placed to play a role or steer the course of events, which were mainly directed by rural non-Shirazi clerics like Abdulamir Al-Jamri.
However the Islamic Front claimed responsibility for a series of terrorist incidents throughout this period. In November 1996, the Front claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Diplomat Hotel, with the group telling the Associated Press “We put a bomb in the Diplomat hotel 20 minutes ago…after the feast…tell the government that we will destroy everyplace.”
Although the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain with time became less relevant as a coherent organization; its influence would be important in various successor organizations, such as the Islamic Action Organization; Amal; which shared the same name as the movement that the Al-Mudarrisi family established in Iraq.
The IFLB was disbanded in 2002 following King Hamad’s amnesty. Many activists returned to Bahrain and formed the Islamic Action Party (Amal) and the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja). Other activists remained in London and the West; becoming involved with entities like the Bahrain Islamic Freedom Movement.
Origins of the Bahrain opposition: Other sections
A major divide within Shia Islam: Al-Da’wah and the Shirazis
Al-Da’wah and the Shirazis in Bahrain
The Da’wah current in Iraq
The Da’wah current in Bahrain
Why do Al-Da’wah & the Islamic Enlightenment society matter?
Origins of the Shirazi current in Bahrain
Consolidation and radicalization of the Shirazis
Differences between the Da’wah & Shirazi factions in Bahrain
Beginnings of labour activism and civil society movements
1953-56 unrest and the Higher Executive Committee
Emergence of left-wing, Marxist and Baathist parties
Whatever happened to Bahrain’s left-wing?
Who were the People’s Bloc?
Who were the Religious Bloc?
Religious Bloc versus the People’s Bloc in the National Assembly
Eclipse of the left
Politicization of Bahraini Shia
The influence of political Islam movements elsewhere
The influence of Ayatollah Khomeini
Politicization of religious festivals
The radicalizing influence of Iran’s Islamic revolution
Growing Shirazi radicalism
Exporting Iran’s Islamic Revolution
Al-Da’wah contacts with Iran’s revolutionary leadership
Changing Iranian allegiances
Saudi oppositionist movements
Announcing the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
Islamic Front aims and ideology
1981 coup attempt by Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain after the failed coup
The Shirazi movement loses favour in Iran
Declining influence: The Islamic front in the 1990s
Iranian support for Bahrain’s Al-Da’wah movement
Moving into the Iranian ideological orbit
What is Welayat Al-Faqih?
Breaking with Shia quietism
Ayatollah Isa Qassim and Welayat Al-Faqih
A new generation of Shia clerics
Hezbollah in Bahrain
References
Ali Alfoneh, 2012: Between reform and revolution: Sheikh Qassim, the Bahraini Shi’a, and Iran
Charles Belgrave, 1960 Personal Column; Hutchinson
Thomas Fibiger: The role of shrines among Shi’a Muslims in Bahrain; University of Aarhus
Thomas Fibiger, 2010: ‘Ashura in Bahrain: Analyses of an Analytical Event; Social Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice
Nelida Fuccaro, 2009: Ordering space, politics and community in Manama, 1880s–1919
Justin J. Gengler, 2011: Ethnic Conflict and Political Mobilization in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf; University of Michigan
Anissa Haddadi, 2012: Bahrain Uncovered: Divided Political Landscape
Bashar al-Hadi, 2005: Ulema’ wa adiba’ al-bahrain; Bait al-Bahrain lil-Darasat wal-Tawthiq
Hasan Tariq al-Hasan: Role of Iran in the Failed Coup of 1981: The IFLB in Bahrain; Middle East Journal; 2011
Timothy Insoll, 2007: Changing identities in the Arabian Gulf: The Archaeology of Identities: A Reader; Routledge
Mansour al-Jamri, 2010: Shia & the State in Bahrain; Integration & Tension
Sandy Russell Jones, 2007: The Battle over Family Law in Bahrain; Middle East Report
Miriam Joyce, 2012: Bahrain from the twentieth century to the Arab Spring: Palgrave Macmillan
Khalid Kanoo, 1998: The House of Kanoo: A Century of an Arabian Family Business; Tauris
Abdulhadi Khalaf, 1998: Contentious politics in Bahrain: From ethnic to national and vice versa
Fuad Khouri, 1980: Tribe and State in Bahrain, University of Chicago Press
Jane Kinninmont, 2012: Bahrain: Beyond the Impasse
Fred Haley Lawson, 1989: Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy; Westview Press
Laurence Louer, Political Impact of Labor Migration in Bahrain; Centre for International Studies and Research
Laurence Louer, 2008: Transnational Shia Politics; Columbia University Press
Abdul-Hameed Salem al-Mahadin, 2007: From the memory of Bahrain; Al-Markaz al-Arabiya lil-Dirasat wal-Nashr
Falah al-Mdaires, 2002: Shiism & Political Protest in Bahrain
Yitzhak Nakash, 2011 Reaching for Power: The Shi’a in the Modern Arab World; Princeton University Press
Katja Neithammer, 2007: Avenues of Political Participation in Bahrain
Sophia Pandya, 2010: Women’s Shia Maatam in Bahrain; Middle Eastern Women’s Studies
Fahim I. Qubain, 1955: Social Classes and Tensions in Bahrain; Middle East Journal
Hassan Ali Radhi, 2003 Judiciary and Arbitration in Bahrain: A Historical and Analytical Study; Brill
Mohammed Ghanim al-Rumaihi, 1973: Social & Political Change in Bahrain Since the First World War; Durham University
Mohammed al-Rumaihi, 1976: Qadaya al-taghayyr al-siyasi wa al-ijtima’I fi-al-bahrain; Al-Wahdah
Jean-Francois Seznec, 2012: Is Reconciliation in Bahrain Possible? Middle East Institute
Joe Stork, 1997: Bahrain’s Crisis Worsens; Middle East Report
Mahdi Abdalla Al-Tajir, 1987: Bahrain, 1920–1945: Britain, the Shaikh, and the Administration; Croom Helm
Dr Amal al-Zayyani: Bahrain; from political independence to international projection
Bahrain Wikileaks:
Reform in Bahrain: Mansour al-Jamri (re. Abdulhadi al-Khawaja)
Wafaa: New Shia rejectionist movement
Bahrain’s Shia opposition: Managing sectarian pressures
Some potential new leaders in Al-Wefaq
Bahrain al-Wefaq hails Iran Supreme Leader’s support
About Muharraq: http://eprints.port.ac.uk/7687/4/Ch-2_AboutMuharraq.pdf
Naturalization issue: http://gulfnews.com/4-971-asians-given-bahrain-nationality-in-56-years-1.253763
General regional references
Paul Aarts & Gerd Nonneman eds. 2005: Saudi Arabia in the Balance; Hurst
Nazih Ayubi, 2001: Overstating the Arab State; Tauris
David Commins, 2012: The Gulf States: A Modern History; Tauris
F. Gregory Gause, 2009: International Relations of the Persian Gulf; Cambridge
Fred Halliday, 1985: The Arabian Peninsula Opposition Movements; MERIP Reports
Khair El-Din Haseeb ed. 1998: Arab-Iranian relations: Centre for Arab unity studies
Mohammad Khalid A. Al-Jassar, 2009 Constancy and Change in Contemporary Kuwait City; Proquest
Toby Craig Jones, 2006: Rebellion on the Saudi Periphery: Modernity, Marginalization, and the Shiʿa Uprising of 1979; International Journal of Middle East Studies
Dr Christin Marschall, 2003: Iran’s Persian Gulf Policy: From Khomeini to Khatami; Routledge
Toby Matthiesen, 2012: A “Saudi Spring?“: The Shi’a Protest Movement in the Eastern Province 2011—2012; Middle East Journal
Toby Matthiesen, 2010: Hizbullah al-Hijaz: A History of The Most Radical Saudi Shi’a Opposition Group; Middle East Journal
Eric McCoy, 2008: Iranians in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates: Migration, Minorities, and Identities in the Persian Gulf Arab States; Proquest
Helem Chapin Metz, ed, 1993: Persian Gulf States: A Country Study: The Constitutional Experiment
Khaldoun Nassan Al-Naqeeb, 2012: Society and State in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula; Routledge
Madawi Al-Rasheed, 2005 Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf; Psychology Press
Rush, ed. 1991: The Ruling Families of Arabia
Frederic Wehrey, 2013: Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings; Columbia University Press, Dec 13, 2013